4.2. Funding Model of PSB

The very existence of PSBs in Bosnia has been put into question recently due to extreme financial hardship and an inability to agree on a functional funding model. Revenues of the PSBs (consisting of a monthly license fee levied on all households, advertising revenues and income from other sources such as rental of equipment to other media outlets) have been decreasing across the board. For example, the annual report of BHRT for 2015 indicates a decrease of 27% in marketing revenues, and a drop in income from license fees from 11.23 million EUR to 10.37 million EUR in comparison to 2014.^[124] Similarly, the RTRS report for 2014 shows that in comparison to 2013, advertising income fell from 2 million EUR to 1.7 million EUR while income from license fees fell much more considerably, from 7.7 million EUR in 2013 to 5.95 million EUR in 2014.^[125] RTRS depends on funding from the Government of Republika Srpska to make up for its losses.^[126] In 2015 alone, 153,387 EUR was allocated to RTRS from the budgetary reserves.^[127]

BHRT and RTVFBiH have been heavily indebted since at least 2011.^[128] While BHRT has managed to pay some of its debt to the European Broadcasting Union, it remains high at €5,254,701.20.^[129] After announcing in mid-2016 that it may shut down due to EBU debts and high running costs, the EBU prolonged the debt payment, though no information was presented to the public.^[130] However, BHRT minimized its programming to an informative program and a sports program. In the meantime, the Parliament discussed possible solutions for the subscription fee collection, which was seen by the BHRT as the first signal of change.^[131] When it comes to RTVFBiH, no recent data are available. However, the absence of published annual financial reports since 2012 is not reassuring.

4.2.1 Roots of the Funding Problem

The roots of the problem can be traced back to four underlying causes. The first is the legal provision that defines how advertising revenues are to be divided among the three broadcasters. The second cause of the crisis is a broken model of collection of the monthly license fee. The third problem is inadequate management, which has failed to address problems of excessive costs and inadequate revenues. The fourth problem is the political interests that attempt to profit from the prolonged financial crisis in order to obtain concessions for their political goals in exchange for supporting a particular solution. In the following paragraphs we will provide a brief analysis of each of these five underlying problems, which will help shed light on the current financial hardship of the PSB in BiH.

The redistribution of income among the three broadcasters which was envisioned by the legal framework (PSB System Laws) simply doesn’t occur in practice. The laws stipulate that 50% of advertising revenues and license fee income will be allocated to BHRT, while 25% will belong to each entity broadcaster: RTVFBiH and RTRS. The purpose of such a solution was twofold: to provide a financial boost for the country-wide BHRT and to create a strong mechanism for the integration of the three broadcasters into a unified PSB system. However, the problem with the formula is especially prominent with regard to the distribution of advertising income. Namely, there is a huge disparity between the three broadcasters when it comes to the collection of advertising revenues (Figure 2) – RTVFBiH earns around 60% of all advertising revenues, and yet it is supposed to keep only 25%, while BHRT, which earns around 15%, is supposed to get 50% of advertising revenues, and RTRS, which earns around 15%, is supposed to get 25% of total advertising revenues.^[132]

Figure 1 Envisaged distribution of marketing revenues among PSBs.^[133]

Figure 2 Real distribution of marketing revenues among PSBs.^[134]

The failure to establish the joint Corporation, which would be in charge of collection and distribution of the license fee and the advertising revenues and the management of facilities and equipment, means that there are no mechanisms for proper collection and management of PSB revenues. As a result of varied advertising revenues, RTVFBiH naturally pushes back on creating the Corporation, which would redistribute its high marketing revenues to the other PSBs. RTRS would like to keep its marketing revenues but also get some of the redistributed license fees collected by FTV. Thus the opposition to creating the redistribution key comes from the entity broadcasters themselves, who naturally do not wish their commercial successes to go towards funding for BHRT or other PSBs performing less well.

Table 1: Advertising Revenues by PSB^[135]

Public Broadcaster	Advertising Income (EUR) (year of last available data)
BHT	1,538,958.57 (2015)
FTV	6,296,792.49 (2012)
RTRS	1,745,802.81 (2014)

The second problem has to do with the inability to collect license fees at a sustainable level. Namely, PSBs in BiH are funded by license fees collected via landline telephone bills, a model that officially expired in June 2016,^[136] and a draft law to adopt the European model of funding of direct taxation has yet to be voted on.^[137] However, collection of license fees had been dropping radically prior to 2016.^[138] The inability to collect license fees was caused by the majority of the population switching to mobile phones, inefficiency in the collection of fees, and boycotts of these fees led by various political parties.^[139] The system of license fee collection was installed as a temporary system nearly a decade ago, but never reformed due to a lack of consensus on the part of political parties and individual broadcasters. In the meantime, the Parliament discussed possible solutions for the subscription fee collection, which was seen by the BHRT as the first signal of change.^[140]

Another crucial problem is inadequate management which is unable or unwilling to undertake the necessary reforms of the PSB system. PSBs incur unnecessarily high fixed costs, and often have a surplus workforce, something which is especially salient at BHRT. Many of these surplus workers are believed to have been “employed in line with political or personal connections,” and a lack of transparency about outsourced production has given rise to rumors of corruption.^[141] Some argue that a reorganization of the entire system ought to have been made a long time ago, and that the system is gigantic, with too many directors and editors, and little accountability.^[142] The bloated workforce is often the subject of complaint. In total, in 2012, there were 1,850 people employed in the PSB system,^[143] while in 2015 BHRT’s highest expense was the salaries of its 875 employees – 49% of its total expenses.^[144] Another serious failure of management relates to the lack of transparency of finances. A financial report for 2015 is only available for BHRT, the latest report for RTRS is for the year 2014, while RTVFBiH’s last report dates back to 2011. A lack of transparency about outsourced production, for example, has given rise to rumors of corruption: “all three companies developed the habit of outsourcing much of the production to private companies, although they had ample capacity to do the job themselves. This became one of the favorite ways of redirecting the funds to the pockets of the managers and their close friends.”^[145] Audits of financial reports of public service broadcasters identify irregularities while entity governments often refuse to accept the findings of the audits.^[146] There are no mechanisms “to ensure that government funding for the media in BiH is legitimate, transparent and in the service of public interest…no specific decision-making body on media subsidies exists, and such funding can easily be misused for particular political and business benefits.”^[147] Additionally, the PSBs regularly fail to incorporate the recommendations from the negative financial audits by the state.^[148] In 2013, the Audit Report for FTV pointed out issues in the financial functioning of this broadcaster such as “lack of respect for procurement procedures, unjustifiable discounts in advertising contracts with two advertising agencies,”^[149] etc. Moreover, there is an explicit criticism of the management of PSBs by the CRA regarding their failure to use effectively all available means to increase collection of the license fee.^[150]

None of the above funding problems could have persisted for such a long time had there not been strong political interests in their perpetuation. Namely, there is a continuous boycott of payment of the license fee by leading politicians, most notably among the Bosnian Croat political leadership, but also in the RS.^[151] Leading Croat politicians have used non-payment of the license fee as a means to achieve their objective of introducing the separate Croat language channel within RTVFBiH – a request strongly opposed by the Bosniak political leadership as well as by a large part of the public and the academic community. The inability to pass an adequate legal framework to replace the now obsolete model of collection of license fees and the resulting near-collapse of BHRT has been deemed by the European Broadcasting Union as in direct contravention of the protocols for BiH’s EU accession.^[152] The Amsterdam Treaty considers the system of public broadcasting as “directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society” and states that countries acceding to the EU must “provide for the funding of public service broadcasting … for the fulfilment of the public service remit.”^[153]

Ultimately, financial instability is a major factor leading to the compromised independence of the PSBs in BiH. In the RS, a recently passed amendment to the RTV law^[154] allowed RTRS to seek budget funds from the entity government if it came up short, though critics argue that this may result in increased control over the broadcaster. Some see this as an attempt to ‘emancipate’ RTRS from the national broadcasting system completely,^[155] though it could also be interpreted as a survival mechanism in the face of financial crisis. The general editor of RTRS claimed that RTRS is “the only completely stable public broadcaster in BiH,” citing their lack of debts and a new headquarters.^[156] However, this stability is mainly due to the fact that their losses (which have been documented in their own reports) are made up for by the government. Media scholars worry that government funding can lead to too much direct control over media. In the case of RTRS, a media analyst disagreed with the editor’s claim that financial stability was the most important criterion for sustainable PSB. He claimed that looking at RTRS, it was clear that their financial stability has not resulted in “quality reporting, proper functioning, let alone independence in reporting.”^[157] Links between control and government funding can be seen in the Federation in the case of government-funded local broadcasters on a cantonal and municipal level, as well as the direct funding of two entity news agencies, SRNA and FENA, which has led to a “grip of government over the media sector.”^[158]

TOP

[1] Elvir Pelešević, ** BHS BHS ** “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Parliament Secures BHRT’s Survival … so far,” Eurovisionary, June 15, 2016.

[2] Katrin Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans: Lost between Models and Realities (Sarajevo: Analitika - Center for Social Research, 2013), p. 25.

[3] Jan Zielonka and Paolo Mancini, Executive Summary: A Media Map of Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2011).

[4] European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Vision 2020: Connecting to a Networked Society (Geneva: EBU, May 20, 2012).

[5] Jackie Harrison and Bridgette Wessels, “A New Public Service Communication Environment? Public Service Broadcasting Values in the Reconfiguring Media”, New Media & Society 7, no. 6 (2005), p. 834.

[6] Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Johannes Bardoel, eds. From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media (Göteborg: Nordicom, 2007), p. 9.

[7] EBU, Vision 2020, p. 85.

[8] Karen Donders and Hilde Van den Bulck, “‘The Digital Argument’ In Contemporary Public Service Media Debates: The Case Of New Management Contract Negotiations for VRT,” in The Value of Public Service Media, eds. Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Fiona Martin (Gothenburg: Nordicom, 2014), p. 147.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Slavko Splichal, “Rethinking Publicness: The Precedence of the Right to Communicate”, Javnost - The Public 9, no. 3 (2002), p. 100.

[11] Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation”, Political Communication 22, no. 2 (2005), p. 148.

[12] Tobias Olsson, “There is No Public Sphere without a Public: An Interview with Slavko Splichal.” Mediální studia 4, no. 1 (2010), p. 68.

[13] Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans, p. 20.

[14] Ibid.

[15] EBU, Vision 2020, p. 10.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Paolo Mancini, “Media Fragmentation, Party System, and Democracy”, The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, no. 1 (2013), pp. 43-60.

[18] Ibid, p. 50.

[19] Some analysts in the UK fear that the BBC license fee system cannot survive and that the license fee funding system is “‘likely to become less sustainable’ and would have to be overhauled entirely.” For example, in Finland the license fee has become a means of income tax, similar in some ways to the French system for funding PSB. In Germany the license fee was found to have lost its constitutional legitimacy and has been transformed into a household tax, and in the Netherlands the license fee was shifted to taxation some years ago.

[20] Ferrell Lowe and Bardoel, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, p. 11.

[21] European Commission, Public Service Broadcasting and State Aid – Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/05/73 (Brussels: European Commission, March 3, 2005).

[22] Karen Donders and Caroline Pauwels, “Does EU Policy Challenge the Digital Future of Public Service Broadcasting?: An Analysis of the Commission's State Aid Approach to Digitization and the Public Service Remit of Public Broadcasting Organizations”, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 14, no. 3 (2008), p. 297.

[23] Public value tests are one form of test which seeks to measure the justification of the use of state funds to fund PSBs – they can be found in the UK, Germany, and Norway. The EU calls for an ‘ex ante test’ any time a PSB remit is sought to be expanded, including “a public consultation which assesses—prior to their introduction—whether ‘significant new audiovisual services envisaged by public service broadcasters serve the democratic, social and cultural needs of the society, while duly taking into account its potential effects on trading conditions and competition’.” Thus many of these tests include considerations both of the public value of PSBs and of their effects on the market and their own economic efficiency. Citation from Hallvard Moe, “Governing Public Service Broadcasting: “Public Value Tests” in Different National Contexts”, Communication, Culture & Critique 3, no. 2 (2010), p. 210.

[24] Ferrell Lowe and Bardoel, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, p. 16.

[25]Annika Sehl, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Alessio Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media (Oxford: Reuters Institute for Journalism, 2016).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Public Service Media Governance (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, February 15, 2012).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Michal Glowacki, “Governance of Public Service Media in Poland: the Role of the Public”, Media and Communication 3, no. 4 (2015), p. 26.

[30] Florian Bieber argues that in South Eastern Europe, “democratic formalities [are] observed, but at the same time, populist parties control the state through patronage structures. This is particularly evident through the dominance of political parties over the media, the state and the weak rule of law.” Florian Bieber, “The Authoritarian Temptation”, Florianbieber.org, March 15, 2014.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, eds., Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 3.

[33] Thanks to Davor Marko in helping the authors make this point.

[34] Karol Jakubowicz, “Public Service Broadcasting: Product (and Victim?) of Public Policy” in Handbook on Global Media and Communication Policy, ed. Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley, 2011), p. 215.

[35] Voltmer corroborates the politicization of the public media in post-communist settings: “In many new democracies of post-communist Eastern Europe, public service has been hijacked by political elites to serve their needs of controlling the public agenda.” Voltmer, Building Media, p. 25.

[36] Ivan Berend and Bojan Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of Contemporary History 50, no. 4 (2015), p. 779.

[37] Ibid, p. 780.

[38] Cambridge Dictionary, definition of “crony capitalism”.

[39] Please see the Annex for the full list of those interviewed.

[40] One of the editors we contacted, informed of the international character of the research project, rejected the interview stating that “the international community” is partially to be blamed for the situation PSB in Bosnia is in.

[41] Tarik Jusić and Nidžara Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention: International Media Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒ Center for Social Research, 2013).

[42] Colloquially referred to as the Dayton Agreement since it was signed in the US military base in Dayton, Ohio, USA.

[43] Edin Hodžić and Nenad Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒ Center for Social Research, 2011).

[44] In BiH, citizens who choose to identify as ‘Bosnian’ rather than one of the three ethnic identities are in the minority and are not structurally validated by the country’s constitutional structure. In the 2013 census, those who identified themselves as Bosnian were lumped into the category of ‘Other’ – along with Roma, Jews, those of other religious identities, and the undefined.

[45] Hodžić and Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering.

[46] Ismet Sejfija and Danica Fink-Hafner, “Citizens’ Protest Innovations in a Consociational System: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Teorija in Praksa 53, no. 1 (2016), p. 197.

[47] Ibid, p. 186.

[48] Dino Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Freedom House, 2016.

[49] Ibid, p. 11.

[50] Jasmin Mujanović, “The Baja Class and the Politics of Participation”, in Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons, ed. Damir Arsenijević (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), p. 138.

[51] Asim Mujkić, “We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis”, Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007), p. 113.

[52] Mujanović, “The Baja Class”, p. 138.

[53] “The unwillingness of international actors (later the architects of the post-war settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina), from the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, to promote and implement decisions and policies that would foster meaningful democratic accountability of elites, participatory civic engagement and the creation of a robust minority rights regime rather than exclusionary ethno-chauvinism.” Mujanović, “The Baja Class.”

[54] Mirna Jusić and Amar Numanović, Flexible Labour in Inflexible Environment: Reforms of Labour Market Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Comparative Perspective (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒Center for Social Research, 2015).

[55] Ages 15-24. Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016.”

[56] “Bosna i Hercegovina peta najsiromašnija država u Evropi” [Bosnia and Herzegovina the Fifth Poorest Country in Europe], Klix.ba, February 22, 2016. See also: World Bank, “Poverty and Equity, Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2016.

[57] Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016”.

[58] Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks, Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia (London: Verso Books, 2015), p.2.

[59] Ibid.

[60] See: Samir Huseinović, “Politiziranje popisa stanovništva u BiH” [Politicizing the census in BiH] Deutsche Welle, April 4, 2016; Charles Recknagel, “Bosnia Erupts in Feuding over New Census Data”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 30, 2016.

[61] Agency of Statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Census of Population, Households, and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: Final Results (Sarajevo: Agency of Statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2016).

[62] Srećko Horvat, “Godot Arrives in Sarajevo”, New York Times, February 19, 2014.

[63] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 15.

[64] Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016”.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Sanela Hodžić and Lidija Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Media Sustainability Index 2016 (Washington: IREX, 2016).

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Sanela Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report: State-media Financial Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Southeastern Europe Media Observatory, November 26, 2015.

[71] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[72] Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRA), Analiza tržišta emitovanja u BiH [Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH] (Sarajevo: CRA, 2013).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[76] Radenko Udovičić, Working Conditions for Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Journalists in a Gap between Devastated Media and Legal Insecurity (Sarajevo, 2015).

[77] Mehmed Halilović, long-time journalist and media analyst, former media ombudsman, interview with author, March 2016.

[78] Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska (RTRS), Izvještaj o poslovanju RTRS-a [Report on the Work of RTRS]” (Banja Luka: Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska, 2014), p. 34; Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHRT), Izvještaj o radu i poslovanju Radiotelevizije Bosne i Hercegovine za 2015. godinu [Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015] (Sarajevo, March 2016), p.16.

[79] Brought to our attention by Gordana Katana, journalist, and Uglješa Vuković, Media analyst, interviews with author, March 2016. See also archives at http://www.analiziraj.ba, accessed 28 April 2017.

[80] In a small research project done by Media Plan, approx. 40% of students in Sarajevo and Mostar perceived the role of N1, a private media company, as essentially providing the functions of a public service broadcaster. Radenko Udovičić, interview with author, April 2016.

[81] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS.

[82] Invest in Group, “Sarajevo Calling”, March 2015.

[83] “Europe – Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Internet World Statistics, August 5, 2016.

[84] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[85] Compared to 1 hour and 50 minutes in Iceland, which has the lowest television viewership. See: EBU Media Intelligence Service, “Europeans & Television: An Overview of TV Viewing Habits across Europe,” EBU, 2016.

[86] Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “PIC Sintra Declaration: Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council” (May 30, 1997) and “PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures” (October 12, 1997).

[87] The NATO Stabilization Force.

[88] For more, see, Monroe E. Price, “Information Intervention: Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, and the Seizure of Broadcasting Transmitters”, Cornell International Law Journal 33, no. 1 (2000).

[89] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 35.

[90] Johnson, Model Interventions, cited in Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 37.

[91] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 40.

[92] http://www.bhrt.ba/

[93] http://www.rtvfbih.ba/loc/ and http://www.federalna.ba/

[94] http://rtrs.tv/

[95] There are also 74 local TV and radio stations which are funded through municipal and cantonal budgets, but are not considered part of the PSB system. In total there are 4 cantonal TV stations, 8 municipality run TV stations, three cantonal and 59 municipality run radio stations, plus a radio station in Brčko. Information from Helena Mandić, director of broadcasting at the Communications Regulatory Agency, interview with author, March 2016.

[96] The Corporation was never established although it is envisaged by the Law on PSB System from 2005.

[97] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 36.

[98] Gotovuša remembers his attempt to influence the BBC team and to draw their attention toward the existence of radio and TV stations at the cantonal and municipality level, proposing that all should be incorporated into one system. “Personally, I believe they did not want to bother with that. All they wanted was to move away from the socialist model we had. And they left these cantonal and municipality broadcasters to exist, up until today, as mere mouthpieces of the political option at a given time over the territory.” Esad Gotovuša, interview with author, April 2016.

[99] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 36.

[100] Tarik Jusić and Amer Džihana, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Divided They Fall: Public Service Broadcasting in Multiethnic States, eds. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, Mark Thompson and Tarik Jusić (Sarajevo: Mediacentar, 2008), p. 101.

[101] Boyko Boev, Analysis of the Laws Pertaining to the Public Service Broadcasting System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, September 2012).

[102] “Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine” [Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 78/05, entered into force November 8, 2005.

[103] Enforcement of this law is questionable given the nonexistence of the Corporation.

[104] “Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom servisu Bosne i Hercegovine” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 92/05, entered into force December 28, 2005.

[105] “Zakon o Radioteleviziji Republike Srpske” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Republika Srpska], Official Gazette of RS 49/06, entered into force on May 11, 2006.

[106] “Zakon o Radioteleviziji Federacije BiH” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of FBiH 48/08, entered into force on August 6, 2008.

[107] A public service broadcasting Corporation which was intended to coordinate the three distinct PSBs as well as “manage the equipment and the transmission network, and be in charge of sales and advertising.”

[108] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 6.

[109] Amer Džihana, editor at Analiziraj.ba and media analyst, interview with author, March 2016.

[110] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[111] Mehmed Halilović and Amer Džihana, eds., Media Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Internews in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012), p. 192.

[112] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[113] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[114] There are reports that discuss the representation of the three constituent languages and whether or not they are adequately and equally represented by the various PSBs. However, no linguists participated in this research. See for example Radenko Udovičić, Tatjana Mrđa, and Aleksandra Mandić, Analiza programa tri javna TV servisa u periodu prime time: Ispoljavanje javne uloge - forma, sadržaj, ukloni [Analysis of programs of three public broadcasters during prime time: The manifestation of the public role: form, content, diffractions ] (Sarajevo: Media Plan Institute, July 2013).

[115] In 2015, monitoring by a local LGBT-focused NGO noted the utter lack of representation of this community in public media. See Dalibor Tanić, “Pozitivnija slika u bh. medijima o LGBT temama [More Positive Picture of LGBT Themes in Bosnian Media]”, LGBT.BA, July 20, 2015.

[116] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[117] Ibid.

[118] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS.

[119] Ibid.

[120] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[121] “Dom naroda PSBiH nije usvojio izvještaje vezane za BHRT [House of Peoples of Bosnia Rejects BHRT Reports],” Vecernji.ba, May 27, 2016.

[122] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 5, “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of RS,” Article 26.

[123] Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report”.

[124] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015, pp. 21-22.

[125] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS, p. 100.

[126] Sanela Hodžić, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Media Integrity Matters: Reclaiming Public Service Values in Media and Journalism, ed. Brankica Petković (Ljubljana: Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies, 2014), p. 122.

[127] Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report”.

[128] Mirza Mušanović, “Zašto tone televizija Federacije BiH” [Why FTV is Sinking], Radio Feral, February 13, 2011.

[129] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[130] “EBU prolongirao rok za naplatu duga” [EBU Prolongs Deadline for Debt Payment], Teve.ba, June 2, 2016.

[131] BHRT, “Saopštenje Upravnog odbora” [Statement of the Steering Committee], June 30, 2016.

[132] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, p. 19.

[133] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[134] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[135] Data from the following reports: CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, p. 8, RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS; BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[136] A temporary model to begin with, Parliament failed to agree on a new model before it expired.

[137] Zekerijah Smajić and Srećko Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse Mirrors Bosnia’s Own Decline”, Balkan Insight, March 2, 2016.

[138] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[139] For examples, see “Dodik pozvao građane RS na bojkot RTV takse” [Dodik called RS citizens to boycott RTV fee], Kliker, July 14, 2008; “50% građana BiH plaća RTV taksu” [50% of Bosnian citizens pay RTV fee], Teve.ba, March 27, 2015; Sanda Slato, “SDS-ova kampanja protiv plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS’s campaign against paying RTV fee], federalna.ba, May 26, 2012; “HDZ 1990 poziva na bojkot Telemacha i BHT-a zbog Edina Džeke!” [HDZ 1990 calls for a boycott of Telemach and BHT because of Edin Dzeko], ntv.ba, September 14, 2011; Oslobođenje, “Kožul: Ne plaćam RTV pretplatu kao ni većina Hrvata u BiH” [Kožul: Like most Croats in BiH, I don’t pay RTV fees!], jabuka.tv, May 20, 2015; “SDS i tzv. Savez za promjene pozvali na bojkot plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS and the so-called Association for Change call for a boycott of RTV fees], RTRS, January 22, 2016.

[140] BHRT, “Statement of the Steering Committee”.

[141] Smajić and Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse”.

[142] “To put it simply - the system is negligent.” Željko Bajić, Journalist at BH Radio 1 and trade union representative, interview with author, March 2016.

[143] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[144] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[145] Smajić and Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse”.

[146] Sanela Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Continuing Political Pressures and Obstructions”, Southeastern Europe Media Observatory, June 21, 2015.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[149] Audit Office for the Institutions of the Federation BiH, Izvještaj o reviziji finansijskih izvještaja javnog servisa ‘Radio-televizija Federacije BiH’ Sarajevo: na dan 31. 12. 2013. [Audit Report on Financial Reports of Public Service Broadcaster RTVFBiH] (Sarajevo: Audit Office for the Institutions of the Federation BiH, June 2014).

[150] “These figures show that at the public broadcasting services there is a lack of management engagement in collecting the license fee at RTVFBiH. This stems from the fact that there is a low level of outstanding fees being pursued through the courts, which, if collected, would further strengthen the financial position of the public service.” CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, Translation by authors.

[151] For examples, see: Dodik pozvao građane RS na bojkot RTV takse” [Dodik called RS citizens to boycott RTV fee], Kliker, July 14, 2008; “50% građana BiH plaća RTV taksu” [50% of Bosnian citizens pay RTV fee], Teve.ba, March 27, 2015; Sanda Slato, “SDS-ova kampanja protiv plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS’s campaign against paying RTV fee], federalna.ba, May 26, 2012; “SDS i tzv. Savez za promjene pozvali na bojkot plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS and the so-called Association for Change call for a boycott of RTV fees], RTRS, January 22, 2016.

[152] European Broadcasting Union, Director General’s Office, “Press Release: EBU Warns Bosnian Public Service Broadcaster is ‘Close to Collapse’”, May 19, 2015.

[153] “Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States” in the European Union, Council of the European Union, “Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts” (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, November 10, 1997).

[154] “Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o Radioteleviziji Republike Srpske” [Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Public Radio-Television Service of RS], Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 89/13.

[155] Emir Habul, “Javni RTV sistem u BiH - Korak do kolapsa” [The PSB System in BiH – a Step from Collapse], Media.ba , February19, 2016.

[156] Siniša Mihailović, general editor of RTRS, interview with author, March 2016.

[157] Uglješa Vuković, interview with author, March 2016.

[158] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[159] Boev, Analysis of the Laws.

[160] Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines”; also see: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015,” p. 9.

[161] “Members in all three broadcasters cannot perform the functions within legislative, executive or judicial power, nor can they hold membership in political parties (according to Rule 57/2011 on Public Radio and TV Broadcasters).” Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines,” p. 9.

[162] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 20.

[163] Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH, “Alternativni izvještaj o napretku 2015: politički kriteriji” [Alternative Progress Report 2016: Political Criteria] (Sarajevo, July 2015).

[164] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[165] “Kako Zlatko Lagumdžija uređuje Dnevnik FTV-a”, Klix.ba, March 4, 2012.

[166] “Bakir Hadžiomerović kandidat SDP-a za člana Predsjedništva BiH!” Slobodna Bosna, July 12, 2014.

[167] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[168] U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015”.

[169] Ibid.

[170] By analyzing the RTRS prime time news program, Gordana Katana notes that the leading political party in this entity dominates the program, while the president of this party remains the central figure of the prime time news. Gordana Katana, interview with author, March 2016. Opposition parties in RS, led by the SDS, the main opposition party, often point to SNSD control over RTRS. Some parties publicly incite people to boycott the license fee. See “SDS: SNSD preuzeo kontrolu nad RTRS-om” [SDS: SNSD has taken control of RTRS], Alternativna televizija, March 22, 2014; Gordana Katana, “RTRS: postupi po naređenju!” [RTRS: Do as ordered! ], Analiziraj.ba, February 27, 2016.

[171] “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 8; “Statut Radiotelevizije Bosne i Hercegovine [Statute of BHRT]”, Article 9; “Statut Radio-televizije Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine [Statute of RTVFBiH]”, Article 8; “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Republika Srpska,” Article 13.

[172] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[173] Tarik Jusić and Louis Kendall Palmer, “The Media and Power-Sharing: Towards an Analytical Framework for Understanding Media Policies in Post-Conflict Societies: Public Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Global Media Journal—Polish Edition 1, no. 4 (2008), p. 132.

[174] Davor Marko, ed., Informisanje na jezicima manjina na Zapadnom Balkanu: Sloboda, pristup, marginalizacija [Informing in minority languages in the Western Balkan: Freedom, acccess, marginalization ] (Sarajevo: Media plan institut, 2013), p. 132.

[175] See Peter Trudgill, Sociolingiustics, 4th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2000), Snježana Kordić, Jezik i nacionalizam [Language and Nationalism] (Zagreb: Durieux 2010), and Ronelle Alexander, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian: A Grammar with Sociolinguistic Commentary (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

[176] Halilović and Džihana, Media Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 192.

[177] Tanić, “More Positive Picture”.

[178] Željka Lekić, Journalist and EBU representative in the Balkans, interview with author, March 2016.

[179] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 20.

[180] European Audiovisual Observatory, “TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAVISE Database on TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services and Companies in Europe, 2015.

[181] The establishment of this body was based on conclusions and recommendations adopted during the conference “Introduction of digital television in Bosnia and Herzegovina” held on 30 March 2006 in Sarajevo.

[182] DTT Forum Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Strategija prelaska s analogne na digitalnu zemaljsku radiodifuziju u frekvencijskim opsezima 174-230 mhz i 470-862 mhz u Bosni i Herzegovini [The Strategy of Transition from Analogue to Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting in the Frequency Bands 174-230 MHz and 470-862 MHz in Bosnia and Herzegovina]”, June 17, 2009.

[183] Former secretary of the Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) Forum, Emir Vajzović, told us that the strategy was well thought out, but that they encountered political difficulties: “Suddenly, new people were appointed to our working groups… we felt like the main problem was that the entire bureaucratic apparatus suddenly started working to prevent our work. Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[184] “Digitalni signal u BiH od 15 marta” [Digital Signal in BiH from 15 March], TeVe.ba, March 1, 2016.

[185] “Jusko: Digitalni signal od 29. septembra” [Jusko: Digital Signal from September 29], Teve.ba, September 21, 2016.

[186] Srna, “KONAČNO Javni RTV servisi u BiH počeli emitovanje digitalnog signala” [Finally, public broadcasters in BiH begin to broadcast digital signals], Blic, October 14, 2016.

[187] Fena, “Objavljen međunarodni tender za drugu fazu digitalizacije RTV servisa u BiH” [International tender announced for second phase of public broadcaster digitalization in BiH], Klix.ba, March 16, 2017.

[188] Former advisor to the Minister of Communications and Transport, Mehmed Agović, claimed that the RS insisted on owning the equipment refusing “to accept any reform which they saw as undermining their entity's powers and empowering a state-level public broadcasting system.” Nevertheless, those at RTRS see the situation differently. Siniša Mihailović of RTRS said that when, some years ago, RTRS obtained its own digitalization equipment and tested it from Kozara mountain, the CRA fined them. Mehmed Agović, interview with author, March 2016. Siniša Mihailović, interview with author, April 2016.

[189] Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[190] “To put it simply, nobody is responsible to anybody. Politicians are not responsible to the people, bureaucrats are not responsible to those who appoint them, and it all ends as a particular mix of laziness, irresponsibility, lack of expertise and in general, a trend wherein we talk more about less important things than about things that are relevant for our everyday lives. The result is that a potentially very good project, which was planned down to the last detail, just crashed, and nobody was considered responsible for that failure.” Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[191] Željka Lekić, interview with author, March 2016.

[192] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[193] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[194] Gordana Katana, interview with author, March 2016.

[195] RTRS: http://www.rtrs.tv/av/video.php

[196] “Development of technology is simply killing us”, Bajić said. “We cannot follow what is happening around the world, and I am afraid that we are arriving at the point where the young generations will not be able to recognize the technology we are using.” Željko Bajić, interview with author, March 2016.

[197] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[200] Berend and Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe”.

[201] Jerzy Hausner and Mirosława Marody, eds, Jakość rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej: EU-monitoring IV [Quality of governance: Poland closer to the European Union: EU-monitoring IV] (Kraków: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2000).

[202] Berend and Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe”, p. 780.

[203] Jakubowicz, “Public Service Broadcasting: Product (and Victim?) of Public Policy”, p. 214.

[204] The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety (London etc.: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016).

[205] Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans, p. 14.

[206] “Postojanje BHRT-a ne smije biti upitno” [The existence of BHRT cannot be put into question] , Mediacentar Online (3 June 2016).

[207] In 2015 BHRT was in seventh place among nine measured public and commercial TV stations on the national level. See Aldin Arnautović, “A Decade of Failures: BHRT – Employee Surplus and Poor Results”, Mediacenter Online, September 6, 2016; and Aldin Arnautović, “A Decade of Failures: Public Broadcasting Service Owes Millions”, Mediacenter Online, September 2, 2016.

[208] Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1.

[209] Ibid.

[210] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[a]Za Jasmina:

Ne mogu ovaj dio teksta da poravnam jer mi oznaka za fusnotu “pobjegne” na kraj reda. Nadam se da vi to možete popraviti?

[b]za jasmina, opet ne mogu poravnati

Contents

Kada se različito postupanje može opravdati? by Vanja Kovač

Kada se različito postupanje može opravdati? by Vanja Kovač

1. Uvod

2. Teorijski i metodološkai Framework BHS

3. Country Background

4. Research Findings on PBS: Key Issues

4.2. Funding Model of PSB

4.3. Politicization of the PSB

4.4 Socio-cultural Aspects of PSB

4.5. Technological Innovations and Digitalization

5. Concluding Remarks

6. Bibliography

About the Authors

Footnotes

4.2. Funding Model of PSB

[180] European Audiovisual Observatory, “TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAVISE Database on TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services and Companies in Europe, 2015.