4.5. Technological Innovations and Digitalization

4.5.1 Digitalization of Broadcasting

While the rest of Europe officially switched to digital terrestrial broadcasting by 2015, BiH still emits an analogue signal, due mainly to a complicated bureaucratic apparatus and a lack of prioritization of the issue. In 2015 the CRA received the first requests to halt the broadcasting of local television stations whose analog signal was disturbing the digital signals of neighboring countries. It is estimated that around 40% of households in Bosnia do not have access to cable TV,^[180] and that the delay in digitalization means that soon they could lose any TV signal.

The digitalization process was introduced in Bosnia in 2006 with the establishment of the DTT Forum, an expert body on digital transmission.^[181] The Forum was given the task of preparing a national strategy for the introduction of DTT standards in BiH, forwarding it to competent state institutions for adoption,^[182] and informing the broader public about the process. Although the Strategy on Digital Switch-Over was adopted in 2009 and the first deadline for transition to a digital signal was set to 2011, the implementation has been delayed for years.^[183] After several failed public tenders for procuring the needed equipment, it was only in 2014 that a company was finally selected to complete the first phase of installation of the new equipment in three major cities (Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar). This was completed in 2016, at a cost of around €3.5 million. It connected five informative-technical centers in the system of digital connections and transmitters for digital signal coverage in these cities.^[184]

The launch of the digital signal has been characterized by stops and starts. In the summer of 2016, it was announced that the digital signal would finally be launched.^[185] However, a few days after the announcement, RTRS announced that they were not ready to launch their signal at the same time as Sarajevo and Mostar – the public were not given the details of this cancellation. The first phase of installation was completed at end of October with a digital test signal,^[186] and a call for tenders for the second phase was put out in March of 2017. The second phase involves the procurement, installation, and testing of equipment that would digitalize more hubs in BiH and connect the country with its neighbors – the job is meant to be finished by early 2018.^[187]

Apart from a complicated bureaucratic procedure in regard to procurement, structural problems built into BiH’s PSB system also slowed digitalization significantly. Legally, BiH’s digital transmitting equipment ought to be in the possession or in the control of the joint Corporation, but since the Corporation was never established, there is no dedicated body in charge of the entire process. Equipment was thus in the possession of each broadcaster,^[188] which fragmented and further complicated the process, as we mentioned in the episode where RTRS attempted to set up a digital signal on its own.

Some of our interlocutors blamed obstructions by the ruling political elite for forcing a potentially good project to fail. Emir Vajzović, general secretary of the DTT Forum, believed that the process could have been completed years ago “if just one minister was eager to push for it.”^[189] Vajzović resigned from his post in 2009, saying that despite a good Action Plan from the DTT, obstructions began to arise from the political and bureaucratic sectors. He guessed that the failure of the process was the result of a lack of attention by politicians on the importance of digitalization, as well as a lack of accountability by the elected leaders to the public,^[190] who were the biggest losers of the process’s failure. The institutionalized lack of accountability to the public arguably created an atmosphere in which the political benefits of digitalization were never clearly articulated or pushed for by ruling politicians. In sum, the failure of digitalization was the collateral damage of dysfunctional public institutions.

Digital switchover also requires digital receivers, different production equipment, and an entirely new approach to programming. It also requires a totally different approach in production and TV programming – including on-demand TV material, providing new ways for the public to tune in, etc.; According to Željka Lekić, “establishing a digital signal while using obsolete TV production equipment doesn’t make sense, and must change.”^[191] Nevertheless, BHT and FTV continue to use outdated equipment, while RTRS, which was created and developed in the 90s, will likely adapt more easily in a technical sense, though adjusting editorial policy to new, modern technologies will be a longer process.

4.5.2 New Media and Modernization

The struggles of BiH’s public broadcasters to adapt to digital media mirror the experience of PSBs in Western Europe. A 2016 Reuters Institute report highlighted that the three key issues facing PSBs were the internal restructuring of PSBs themselves, adapting to mobile platforms, and using social media more effectively.^[192] However, though BiH faces these struggles as well, there is far less attention paid to this topic and no public discussion of the shift to ‘public service media’. Hence, PSBs in BIH still rely on an idea of a traditional public and use traditional channels in order to communicate with them. The focus on delayed digitalization has arguably distracted PSBs from questions of modernization in the domain of production, internal re-structuration and introduction of new forms of governance, use of a variety of new communication channels (including social media), introduction of new services, and online presence in general. These challenges are absent from debates about PSB in BiH, although they are crucial for the sustainability of PSB in the modern age as well as for the maintenance of their legitimacy as public institutions.

The cumbersome and dysfunctional PSBs in BiH are inadequately prepared to face production challenges in the digital age. Only RTRS has begun the construction of a digital studio, while the other two broadcasters have managed to make small adjustments over the years. As a consequence, the trend of mixed newsrooms, which blur the distinction between media such as radio, TV, and online content, has not begun in Bosnia. Additionally, public broadcasters in Bosnia still employ too many people, especially in production and administrative departments, which makes efficient digital production unlikely. BHRT employs over 870 people, including 353 in production, 108 in different administrative positions, and 62working for the management.^[193] At the same time, only about 7 people are employed in BHRT’s web department, which points to a lack of understanding of the importance of this medium as well as a general lack of funding to devote to it.^[194] In contrast, commercial and private media appear to have devoted significantly more resources to new media and integrated newsrooms, which has led to a larger following online and on social networks. No such strategy to move towards this model exists in the PSBs today.

All three broadcasters have only started investing in their online presence, although their websites are ranked quite low in BiH, in terms of reported audience. BHRT has continuous online streaming of its TV programs; RTRS offers an entire archive of primetime news starting from March 2009 onwards as well as live-streaming of its news program,^[195] while RTVFBiH launched a news portal called federalna.ba in 2011, which provides content that differs from that on TV, along with their main web page. According to analytics tool Alexa.com, as of July 2016, the top 10 visited websites in BiH do not include any of the three public broadcasters. In the top ten were social networks, and the only two websites offering informative content were the local privately owned portal Klix.ba (ranked 6th) and the regional Aljazeera office (10th). Also prevalent were the Serbian Blic.rs (15th) and Kurir.rs (21st) and Croatian Jutarnj.hr (20th). In contrast, the PSB websites were ranked as follows: RTRS 178th, Federalna.ba 708th, RTVFBiH 955th, and BHRT 1024th.

Part of this low ranking can be ascribed to the fact that these websites are of low quality. While content as such is accessible on the site, there are no multimedia options and a lack of varied audiovisual content, even low-cost content such as podcasts, phone apps and the like. They are also minimally interactive: BHRT’s website does not have a comment function, and while RTVFBiH and RTRS do provide the possibility to comment, they are moderated and most comment sections are empty. There is no way for citizens to participate in the work of the PSBs or engage in a two-way flow of information. Also, the PSBs do not offer on-demand programs, which are in increased demand in the media market.^[196]

The stalled nature of this conversation makes it less likely that the PSBs will adapt successfully to the new digital environment. A 2016 Reuters institute study identified four external conditions and two internal conditions for PSBs to perform well in a digital environment. They included operation in technologically advanced media markets, high levels of public funding, integration across all media platforms, and insulation from direct political influence.^[197] The two internal conditions are “a pro-digital culture where new media are seen as opportunities rather than as threats” and “senior editorial leaders who have clearly and publicly underlined the need to continually change the organization to adapt to a changing media environment.”^[198] In the context of BiH, it is evident that none of these conditions are present, mainly due to external limitations and internal stagnation – something which points to a troubling future for the PSBs in the digital era.

TOP

[1] Elvir Pelešević, **ENG ** “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Parliament Secures BHRT’s Survival … so far,” Eurovisionary, June 15, 2016.

[2] Katrin Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans: Lost between Models and Realities (Sarajevo: Analitika - Center for Social Research, 2013), p. 25.

[3] Jan Zielonka and Paolo Mancini, Executive Summary: A Media Map of Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2011).

[4] European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Vision 2020: Connecting to a Networked Society (Geneva: EBU, May 20, 2012).

[5] Jackie Harrison and Bridgette Wessels, “A New Public Service Communication Environment? Public Service Broadcasting Values in the Reconfiguring Media”, New Media & Society 7, no. 6 (2005), p. 834.

[6] Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Johannes Bardoel, eds. From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media (Göteborg: Nordicom, 2007), p. 9.

[7] EBU, Vision 2020, p. 85.

[8] Karen Donders and Hilde Van den Bulck, “‘The Digital Argument’ In Contemporary Public Service Media Debates: The Case Of New Management Contract Negotiations for VRT,” in The Value of Public Service Media, eds. Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Fiona Martin (Gothenburg: Nordicom, 2014), p. 147.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Slavko Splichal, “Rethinking Publicness: The Precedence of the Right to Communicate”, Javnost - The Public 9, no. 3 (2002), p. 100.

[11] Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation”, Political Communication 22, no. 2 (2005), p. 148.

[12] Tobias Olsson, “There is No Public Sphere without a Public: An Interview with Slavko Splichal.” Mediální studia 4, no. 1 (2010), p. 68.

[13] Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans, p. 20.

[14] Ibid.

[15] EBU, Vision 2020, p. 10.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Paolo Mancini, “Media Fragmentation, Party System, and Democracy”, The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, no. 1 (2013), pp. 43-60.

[18] Ibid, p. 50.

[19] Some analysts in the UK fear that the BBC license fee system cannot survive and that the license fee funding system is “‘likely to become less sustainable’ and would have to be overhauled entirely.” For example, in Finland the license fee has become a means of income tax, similar in some ways to the French system for funding PSB. In Germany the license fee was found to have lost its constitutional legitimacy and has been transformed into a household tax, and in the Netherlands the license fee was shifted to taxation some years ago.

[20] Ferrell Lowe and Bardoel, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, p. 11.

[21] European Commission, Public Service Broadcasting and State Aid – Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/05/73 (Brussels: European Commission, March 3, 2005).

[22] Karen Donders and Caroline Pauwels, “Does EU Policy Challenge the Digital Future of Public Service Broadcasting?: An Analysis of the Commission's State Aid Approach to Digitization and the Public Service Remit of Public Broadcasting Organizations”, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 14, no. 3 (2008), p. 297.

[23] Public value tests are one form of test which seeks to measure the justification of the use of state funds to fund PSBs – they can be found in the UK, Germany, and Norway. The EU calls for an ‘ex ante test’ any time a PSB remit is sought to be expanded, including “a public consultation which assesses—prior to their introduction—whether ‘significant new audiovisual services envisaged by public service broadcasters serve the democratic, social and cultural needs of the society, while duly taking into account its potential effects on trading conditions and competition’.” Thus many of these tests include considerations both of the public value of PSBs and of their effects on the market and their own economic efficiency. Citation from Hallvard Moe, “Governing Public Service Broadcasting: “Public Value Tests” in Different National Contexts”, Communication, Culture & Critique 3, no. 2 (2010), p. 210.

[24] Ferrell Lowe and Bardoel, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, p. 16.

[25]Annika Sehl, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Alessio Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media (Oxford: Reuters Institute for Journalism, 2016).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Public Service Media Governance (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, February 15, 2012).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Michal Glowacki, “Governance of Public Service Media in Poland: the Role of the Public”, Media and Communication 3, no. 4 (2015), p. 26.

[30] Florian Bieber argues that in South Eastern Europe, “democratic formalities [are] observed, but at the same time, populist parties control the state through patronage structures. This is particularly evident through the dominance of political parties over the media, the state and the weak rule of law.” Florian Bieber, “The Authoritarian Temptation”, Florianbieber.org, March 15, 2014.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, eds., Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 3.

[33] Thanks to Davor Marko in helping the authors make this point.

[34] Karol Jakubowicz, “Public Service Broadcasting: Product (and Victim?) of Public Policy” in Handbook on Global Media and Communication Policy, ed. Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley, 2011), p. 215.

[35] Voltmer corroborates the politicization of the public media in post-communist settings: “In many new democracies of post-communist Eastern Europe, public service has been hijacked by political elites to serve their needs of controlling the public agenda.” Voltmer, Building Media, p. 25.

[36] Ivan Berend and Bojan Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of Contemporary History 50, no. 4 (2015), p. 779.

[37] Ibid, p. 780.

[38] Cambridge Dictionary, definition of “crony capitalism”.

[39] Please see the Annex for the full list of those interviewed.

[40] One of the editors we contacted, informed of the international character of the research project, rejected the interview stating that “the international community” is partially to be blamed for the situation PSB in Bosnia is in.

[41] Tarik Jusić and Nidžara Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention: International Media Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒ Center for Social Research, 2013).

[42] Colloquially referred to as the Dayton Agreement since it was signed in the US military base in Dayton, Ohio, USA.

[43] Edin Hodžić and Nenad Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒ Center for Social Research, 2011).

[44] In BiH, citizens who choose to identify as ‘Bosnian’ rather than one of the three ethnic identities are in the minority and are not structurally validated by the country’s constitutional structure. In the 2013 census, those who identified themselves as Bosnian were lumped into the category of ‘Other’ – along with Roma, Jews, those of other religious identities, and the undefined.

[45] Hodžić and Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering.

[46] Ismet Sejfija and Danica Fink-Hafner, “Citizens’ Protest Innovations in a Consociational System: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Teorija in Praksa 53, no. 1 (2016), p. 197.

[47] Ibid, p. 186.

[48] Dino Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Freedom House, 2016.

[49] Ibid, p. 11.

[50] Jasmin Mujanović, “The Baja Class and the Politics of Participation”, in Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons, ed. Damir Arsenijević (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), p. 138.

[51] Asim Mujkić, “We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis”, Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007), p. 113.

[52] Mujanović, “The Baja Class”, p. 138.

[53] “The unwillingness of international actors (later the architects of the post-war settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina), from the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, to promote and implement decisions and policies that would foster meaningful democratic accountability of elites, participatory civic engagement and the creation of a robust minority rights regime rather than exclusionary ethno-chauvinism.” Mujanović, “The Baja Class.”

[54] Mirna Jusić and Amar Numanović, Flexible Labour in Inflexible Environment: Reforms of Labour Market Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Comparative Perspective (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒Center for Social Research, 2015).

[55] Ages 15-24. Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016.”

[56] “Bosna i Hercegovina peta najsiromašnija država u Evropi” [Bosnia and Herzegovina the Fifth Poorest Country in Europe], Klix.ba, February 22, 2016. See also: World Bank, “Poverty and Equity, Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2016.

[57] Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016”.

[58] Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks, Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia (London: Verso Books, 2015), p.2.

[59] Ibid.

[60] See: Samir Huseinović, “Politiziranje popisa stanovništva u BiH” [Politicizing the census in BiH] Deutsche Welle, April 4, 2016; Charles Recknagel, “Bosnia Erupts in Feuding over New Census Data”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 30, 2016.

[61] Agency of Statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Census of Population, Households, and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: Final Results (Sarajevo: Agency of Statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2016).

[62] Srećko Horvat, “Godot Arrives in Sarajevo”, New York Times, February 19, 2014.

[63] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 15.

[64] Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016”.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Sanela Hodžić and Lidija Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Media Sustainability Index 2016 (Washington: IREX, 2016).

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Sanela Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report: State-media Financial Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Southeastern Europe Media Observatory, November 26, 2015.

[71] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[72] Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRA), Analiza tržišta emitovanja u BiH [Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH] (Sarajevo: CRA, 2013).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[76] Radenko Udovičić, Working Conditions for Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Journalists in a Gap between Devastated Media and Legal Insecurity (Sarajevo, 2015).

[77] Mehmed Halilović, long-time journalist and media analyst, former media ombudsman, interview with author, March 2016.

[78] Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska (RTRS), Izvještaj o poslovanju RTRS-a [Report on the Work of RTRS]” (Banja Luka: Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska, 2014), p. 34; Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHRT), Izvještaj o radu i poslovanju Radiotelevizije Bosne i Hercegovine za 2015. godinu [Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015] (Sarajevo, March 2016), p.16.

[79] Brought to our attention by Gordana Katana, journalist, and Uglješa Vuković, Media analyst, interviews with author, March 2016. See also archives at http://www.analiziraj.ba, accessed 28 April 2017.

[80] In a small research project done by Media Plan, approx. 40% of students in Sarajevo and Mostar perceived the role of N1, a private media company, as essentially providing the functions of a public service broadcaster. Radenko Udovičić, interview with author, April 2016.

[81] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS.

[82] Invest in Group, “Sarajevo Calling”, March 2015.

[83] “Europe – Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Internet World Statistics, August 5, 2016.

[84] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[85] Compared to 1 hour and 50 minutes in Iceland, which has the lowest television viewership. See: EBU Media Intelligence Service, “Europeans & Television: An Overview of TV Viewing Habits across Europe,” EBU, 2016.

[86] Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “PIC Sintra Declaration: Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council” (May 30, 1997) and “PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures” (October 12, 1997).

[87] The NATO Stabilization Force.

[88] For more, see, Monroe E. Price, “Information Intervention: Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, and the Seizure of Broadcasting Transmitters”, Cornell International Law Journal 33, no. 1 (2000).

[89] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 35.

[90] Johnson, Model Interventions, cited in Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 37.

[91] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 40.

[92] http://www.bhrt.ba/

[93] http://www.rtvfbih.ba/loc/ and http://www.federalna.ba/

[94] http://rtrs.tv/

[95] There are also 74 local TV and radio stations which are funded through municipal and cantonal budgets, but are not considered part of the PSB system. In total there are 4 cantonal TV stations, 8 municipality run TV stations, three cantonal and 59 municipality run radio stations, plus a radio station in Brčko. Information from Helena Mandić, director of broadcasting at the Communications Regulatory Agency, interview with author, March 2016.

[96] The Corporation was never established although it is envisaged by the Law on PSB System from 2005.

[97] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 36.

[98] Gotovuša remembers his attempt to influence the BBC team and to draw their attention toward the existence of radio and TV stations at the cantonal and municipality level, proposing that all should be incorporated into one system. “Personally, I believe they did not want to bother with that. All they wanted was to move away from the socialist model we had. And they left these cantonal and municipality broadcasters to exist, up until today, as mere mouthpieces of the political option at a given time over the territory.” Esad Gotovuša, interview with author, April 2016.

[99] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 36.

[100] Tarik Jusić and Amer Džihana, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Divided They Fall: Public Service Broadcasting in Multiethnic States, eds. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, Mark Thompson and Tarik Jusić (Sarajevo: Mediacentar, 2008), p. 101.

[101] Boyko Boev, Analysis of the Laws Pertaining to the Public Service Broadcasting System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, September 2012).

[102] “Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine” [Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 78/05, entered into force November 8, 2005.

[103] Enforcement of this law is questionable given the nonexistence of the Corporation.

[104] “Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom servisu Bosne i Hercegovine” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 92/05, entered into force December 28, 2005.

[105] “Zakon o Radioteleviziji Republike Srpske” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Republika Srpska], Official Gazette of RS 49/06, entered into force on May 11, 2006.

[106] “Zakon o Radioteleviziji Federacije BiH” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of FBiH 48/08, entered into force on August 6, 2008.

[107] A public service broadcasting Corporation which was intended to coordinate the three distinct PSBs as well as “manage the equipment and the transmission network, and be in charge of sales and advertising.”

[108] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 6.

[109] Amer Džihana, editor at Analiziraj.ba and media analyst, interview with author, March 2016.

[110] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[111] Mehmed Halilović and Amer Džihana, eds., Media Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Internews in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012), p. 192.

[112] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[113] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[114] There are reports that discuss the representation of the three constituent languages and whether or not they are adequately and equally represented by the various PSBs. However, no linguists participated in this research. See for example Radenko Udovičić, Tatjana Mrđa, and Aleksandra Mandić, Analiza programa tri javna TV servisa u periodu prime time: Ispoljavanje javne uloge - forma, sadržaj, ukloni [Analysis of programs of three public broadcasters during prime time: The manifestation of the public role: form, content, diffractions ] (Sarajevo: Media Plan Institute, July 2013).

[115] In 2015, monitoring by a local LGBT-focused NGO noted the utter lack of representation of this community in public media. See Dalibor Tanić, “Pozitivnija slika u bh. medijima o LGBT temama [More Positive Picture of LGBT Themes in Bosnian Media]”, LGBT.BA, July 20, 2015.

[116] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[117] Ibid.

[118] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS.

[119] Ibid.

[120] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[121] “Dom naroda PSBiH nije usvojio izvještaje vezane za BHRT [House of Peoples of Bosnia Rejects BHRT Reports],” Vecernji.ba, May 27, 2016.

[122] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 5, “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of RS,” Article 26.

[123] Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report”.

[124] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015, pp. 21-22.

[125] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS, p. 100.

[126] Sanela Hodžić, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Media Integrity Matters: Reclaiming Public Service Values in Media and Journalism, ed. Brankica Petković (Ljubljana: Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies, 2014), p. 122.

[127] Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report”.

[128] Mirza Mušanović, “Zašto tone televizija Federacije BiH” [Why FTV is Sinking], Radio Feral, February 13, 2011.

[129] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[130] “EBU prolongirao rok za naplatu duga” [EBU Prolongs Deadline for Debt Payment], Teve.ba, June 2, 2016.

[131] BHRT, “Saopštenje Upravnog odbora” [Statement of the Steering Committee], June 30, 2016.

[132] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, p. 19.

[133] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[134] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[135] Data from the following reports: CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, p. 8, RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS; BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[136] A temporary model to begin with, Parliament failed to agree on a new model before it expired.

[137] Zekerijah Smajić and Srećko Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse Mirrors Bosnia’s Own Decline”, Balkan Insight, March 2, 2016.

[138] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[139] For examples, see “Dodik pozvao građane RS na bojkot RTV takse” [Dodik called RS citizens to boycott RTV fee], Kliker, July 14, 2008; “50% građana BiH plaća RTV taksu” [50% of Bosnian citizens pay RTV fee], Teve.ba, March 27, 2015; Sanda Slato, “SDS-ova kampanja protiv plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS’s campaign against paying RTV fee], federalna.ba, May 26, 2012; “HDZ 1990 poziva na bojkot Telemacha i BHT-a zbog Edina Džeke!” [HDZ 1990 calls for a boycott of Telemach and BHT because of Edin Dzeko], ntv.ba, September 14, 2011; Oslobođenje, “Kožul: Ne plaćam RTV pretplatu kao ni većina Hrvata u BiH” [Kožul: Like most Croats in BiH, I don’t pay RTV fees!], jabuka.tv, May 20, 2015; “SDS i tzv. Savez za promjene pozvali na bojkot plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS and the so-called Association for Change call for a boycott of RTV fees], RTRS, January 22, 2016.

[140] BHRT, “Statement of the Steering Committee”.

[141] Smajić and Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse”.

[142] “To put it simply - the system is negligent.” Željko Bajić, Journalist at BH Radio 1 and trade union representative, interview with author, March 2016.

[143] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[144] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[145] Smajić and Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse”.

[146] Sanela Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Continuing Political Pressures and Obstructions”, Southeastern Europe Media Observatory, June 21, 2015.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[149] Audit Office for the Institutions of the Federation BiH, Izvještaj o reviziji finansijskih izvještaja javnog servisa ‘Radio-televizija Federacije BiH’ Sarajevo: na dan 31. 12. 2013. [Audit Report on Financial Reports of Public Service Broadcaster RTVFBiH] (Sarajevo: Audit Office for the Institutions of the Federation BiH, June 2014).

[150] “These figures show that at the public broadcasting services there is a lack of management engagement in collecting the license fee at RTVFBiH. This stems from the fact that there is a low level of outstanding fees being pursued through the courts, which, if collected, would further strengthen the financial position of the public service.” CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, Translation by authors.

[151] For examples, see: Dodik pozvao građane RS na bojkot RTV takse” [Dodik called RS citizens to boycott RTV fee], Kliker, July 14, 2008; “50% građana BiH plaća RTV taksu” [50% of Bosnian citizens pay RTV fee], Teve.ba, March 27, 2015; Sanda Slato, “SDS-ova kampanja protiv plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS’s campaign against paying RTV fee], federalna.ba, May 26, 2012; “SDS i tzv. Savez za promjene pozvali na bojkot plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS and the so-called Association for Change call for a boycott of RTV fees], RTRS, January 22, 2016.

[152] European Broadcasting Union, Director General’s Office, “Press Release: EBU Warns Bosnian Public Service Broadcaster is ‘Close to Collapse’”, May 19, 2015.

[153] “Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States” in the European Union, Council of the European Union, “Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts” (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, November 10, 1997).

[154] “Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o Radioteleviziji Republike Srpske” [Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Public Radio-Television Service of RS], Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 89/13.

[155] Emir Habul, “Javni RTV sistem u BiH - Korak do kolapsa” [The PSB System in BiH – a Step from Collapse], Media.ba , February19, 2016.

[156] Siniša Mihailović, general editor of RTRS, interview with author, March 2016.

[157] Uglješa Vuković, interview with author, March 2016.

[158] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[159] Boev, Analysis of the Laws.

[160] Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines”; also see: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015,” p. 9.

[161] “Members in all three broadcasters cannot perform the functions within legislative, executive or judicial power, nor can they hold membership in political parties (according to Rule 57/2011 on Public Radio and TV Broadcasters).” Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines,” p. 9.

[162] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 20.

[163] Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH, “Alternativni izvještaj o napretku 2015: politički kriteriji” [Alternative Progress Report 2016: Political Criteria] (Sarajevo, July 2015).

[164] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[165] “Kako Zlatko Lagumdžija uređuje Dnevnik FTV-a”, Klix.ba, March 4, 2012.

[166] “Bakir Hadžiomerović kandidat SDP-a za člana Predsjedništva BiH!” Slobodna Bosna, July 12, 2014.

[167] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[168] U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015”.

[169] Ibid.

[170] By analyzing the RTRS prime time news program, Gordana Katana notes that the leading political party in this entity dominates the program, while the president of this party remains the central figure of the prime time news. Gordana Katana, interview with author, March 2016. Opposition parties in RS, led by the SDS, the main opposition party, often point to SNSD control over RTRS. Some parties publicly incite people to boycott the license fee. See “SDS: SNSD preuzeo kontrolu nad RTRS-om” [SDS: SNSD has taken control of RTRS], Alternativna televizija, March 22, 2014; Gordana Katana, “RTRS: postupi po naređenju!” [RTRS: Do as ordered! ], Analiziraj.ba, February 27, 2016.

[171] “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 8; “Statut Radiotelevizije Bosne i Hercegovine [Statute of BHRT]”, Article 9; “Statut Radio-televizije Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine [Statute of RTVFBiH]”, Article 8; “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Republika Srpska,” Article 13.

[172] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[173] Tarik Jusić and Louis Kendall Palmer, “The Media and Power-Sharing: Towards an Analytical Framework for Understanding Media Policies in Post-Conflict Societies: Public Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Global Media Journal—Polish Edition 1, no. 4 (2008), p. 132.

[174] Davor Marko, ed., Informisanje na jezicima manjina na Zapadnom Balkanu: Sloboda, pristup, marginalizacija [Informing in minority languages in the Western Balkan: Freedom, acccess, marginalization ] (Sarajevo: Media plan institut, 2013), p. 132.

[175] See Peter Trudgill, Sociolingiustics, 4th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2000), Snježana Kordić, Jezik i nacionalizam [Language and Nationalism] (Zagreb: Durieux 2010), and Ronelle Alexander, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian: A Grammar with Sociolinguistic Commentary (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

[176] Halilović and Džihana, Media Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 192.

[177] Tanić, “More Positive Picture”.

[178] Željka Lekić, Journalist and EBU representative in the Balkans, interview with author, March 2016.

[179] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 20.

[180] European Audiovisual Observatory, “TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAVISE Database on TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services and Companies in Europe, 2015.

[181] The establishment of this body was based on conclusions and recommendations adopted during the conference “Introduction of digital television in Bosnia and Herzegovina” held on 30 March 2006 in Sarajevo.

[182] DTT Forum Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Strategija prelaska s analogne na digitalnu zemaljsku radiodifuziju u frekvencijskim opsezima 174-230 mhz i 470-862 mhz u Bosni i Herzegovini [The Strategy of Transition from Analogue to Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting in the Frequency Bands 174-230 MHz and 470-862 MHz in Bosnia and Herzegovina]”, June 17, 2009.

[183] Former secretary of the Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) Forum, Emir Vajzović, told us that the strategy was well thought out, but that they encountered political difficulties: “Suddenly, new people were appointed to our working groups… we felt like the main problem was that the entire bureaucratic apparatus suddenly started working to prevent our work. Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[184] “Digitalni signal u BiH od 15 marta” [Digital Signal in BiH from 15 March], TeVe.ba, March 1, 2016.

[185] “Jusko: Digitalni signal od 29. septembra” [Jusko: Digital Signal from September 29], Teve.ba, September 21, 2016.

[186] Srna, “KONAČNO Javni RTV servisi u BiH počeli emitovanje digitalnog signala” [Finally, public broadcasters in BiH begin to broadcast digital signals], Blic, October 14, 2016.

[187] Fena, “Objavljen međunarodni tender za drugu fazu digitalizacije RTV servisa u BiH” [International tender announced for second phase of public broadcaster digitalization in BiH], Klix.ba, March 16, 2017.

[188] Former advisor to the Minister of Communications and Transport, Mehmed Agović, claimed that the RS insisted on owning the equipment refusing “to accept any reform which they saw as undermining their entity's powers and empowering a state-level public broadcasting system.” Nevertheless, those at RTRS see the situation differently. Siniša Mihailović of RTRS said that when, some years ago, RTRS obtained its own digitalization equipment and tested it from Kozara mountain, the CRA fined them. Mehmed Agović, interview with author, March 2016. Siniša Mihailović, interview with author, April 2016.

[189] Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[190] “To put it simply, nobody is responsible to anybody. Politicians are not responsible to the people, bureaucrats are not responsible to those who appoint them, and it all ends as a particular mix of laziness, irresponsibility, lack of expertise and in general, a trend wherein we talk more about less important things than about things that are relevant for our everyday lives. The result is that a potentially very good project, which was planned down to the last detail, just crashed, and nobody was considered responsible for that failure.” Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[191] Željka Lekić, interview with author, March 2016.

[192] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[193] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[194] Gordana Katana, interview with author, March 2016.

[195] RTRS: http://www.rtrs.tv/av/video.php

[196] “Development of technology is simply killing us”, Bajić said. “We cannot follow what is happening around the world, and I am afraid that we are arriving at the point where the young generations will not be able to recognize the technology we are using.” Željko Bajić, interview with author, March 2016.

[197] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[200] Berend and Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe”.

[201] Jerzy Hausner and Mirosława Marody, eds, Jakość rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej: EU-monitoring IV [Quality of governance: Poland closer to the European Union: EU-monitoring IV] (Kraków: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2000).

[202] Berend and Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe”, p. 780.

[203] Jakubowicz, “Public Service Broadcasting: Product (and Victim?) of Public Policy”, p. 214.

[204] The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety (London etc.: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016).

[205] Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans, p. 14.

[206] “Postojanje BHRT-a ne smije biti upitno” [The existence of BHRT cannot be put into question] , Mediacentar Online (3 June 2016).

[207] In 2015 BHRT was in seventh place among nine measured public and commercial TV stations on the national level. See Aldin Arnautović, “A Decade of Failures: BHRT – Employee Surplus and Poor Results”, Mediacenter Online, September 6, 2016; and Aldin Arnautović, “A Decade of Failures: Public Broadcasting Service Owes Millions”, Mediacenter Online, September 2, 2016.

[208] Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1.

[209] Ibid.

[210] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[a]Za Jasmina:

Ne mogu ovaj dio teksta da poravnam jer mi oznaka za fusnotu “pobjegne” na kraj reda. Nadam se da vi to možete popraviti?

[b]za jasmina, opet ne mogu poravnati

Contents

When can disparate treatment be justified? by Vanja Kovač

When can disparate treatment be justified? by Vanja Kovač

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

3. Country Background

4. Research Findings on PBS: Key Issues

4.2. Funding Model of PSB

4.3. Politicization of the PSB

4.4 Socio-cultural Aspects of PSB

4.5. Technological Innovations and Digitalization

5. Concluding Remarks

6. Bibliography

About the Authors

Footnotes

4.5. Technological Innovations and Digitalization

[180] European Audiovisual Observatory, “TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAVISE Database on TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services and Companies in Europe, 2015.